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TOWARD AN EXPANDED VIEW OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAIM IN ENTRAPMENT CASES*
Paul Marcust

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a very serious crime problem, 1 indicated
not only in terms of bare numbers but also in terms of the many
individuals directly affected by crime.2 Significantly, crime has
an adverse effect on the way we view ourselves and our society.3

* This is the written version of a lecture given in February 1988 while the author
was Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Georgia State University College of Law.
t Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law; A.B. 1968, University of
California. Los Angeles; J.D. 1971, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. See FBI, 1987 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 163 (1988):
Nationwide, law enforcement agencies made an estimated 12.7 million arrests
in 1987 for all criminal infractions except traffic violations. When the arrest
volume was related to the total United States population, the arrest rate
was 5,330 per 100,000 inhabitants. In cities with populations of 250,000 or
more, the rate was 7,808, the highest recorded .... Increases of 25 percent
were shown for both total arrests and arrests for violent crimes in the 10year period, 1978-1987.••• The 1987 drug abuse violation arrest total was 13
percent above the 1986 figures and 38 percent higher than in 1983.
Jd.
2. See Davis, The Crime Victim's "Right" to a Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed
Model Statute for the Govrmzance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DE PAUL L. REv.
329 (1989). Summarizing calculations recently published by the Justice Department,
Professor Davis states that "[o]ne out of every 133 Americans will be murdered," 83%
"will be victims or intended victims of violent crimes at some point in their lives," and
nearly 30% "will be the victim of a robbery or attempted robbery." Id. at 331-32.
3. In the fall semester of 1988, the author was a visiting professor at the University
of Geneva, Criminal Law Department, Geneva, Switzerland. During that time I observed
a nation which has a virtually nonexistent violent 'crime rate. The impact of such a rate
on the way people live is readily apparent. People are willing to walk in the evenings
by themselves seemingly with no fear; they are not reluctant to send their teenage
children out at night in unsupervised activities; public transportation thrives in the middle
of all major cities at almost all times of the day; and though people at parties discuss
many issues, violent crime is not one- of them. Moreover, the Swiss newspapers and
television commentators give little time to discussion of criminal justice. See SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1987, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS 123 (1988) (survey shows 40% of U.S. citizens think the crime rate in their
area is increasing, slightly more than 40% think it has remained the same, and less than
20% think it is decreasing).
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The crime problem in the United States is a very difficult one
and will not go away quickly.4 Certainly, much needs to be done
in the United States to combat crime. Our society needs to attack
more vigorously both the underlying causes of crime and the
way in which criminal activity is detected, investigated, charged,
and resolved. Still, I strongly advocate a position which may
appear to be naive regarding law enforcement needs vis-a-vis
crime problems.5 My view is that in the name of combatting
violent crime we have gone too far, or more precisely we have
allowed law enforcement officials to go too far in detecting and
investigating crime. We have reached the state of police
involvement in crime that Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit wrote
of more than twenty-five years ago, where "enough is more than
enough- it is just too much." 6 Our justice system has allowed
and encouraged law enforcement officials to instigate crime and
at times create crime where crime would not have existed without
government involvement. I propose a sharply expanded view of
the way in which the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments is applied so as to limit overinvolvement by law
enforcement officials in crime.7
I.

THE TRADITIONAL DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE

In several important areas an expansive view of the due
process clause is not necessary, because other well established
constitutional doctrines address claims regarding overinvolvement
of the police. For instance, if law enforcement officers fail to give
adequate warnings regarding the fifth amendment privilege
4. For an excellent treatment of the causes of crime, as well as the impact throughout
society, for both the United States and Switzerland, see Clinard, CUics With Little CriTIU?
(ASA Rose Monograph 1978).
5. For the similar views of some prominent judges, see infra text accompanying notes
36, 40, and 47.
6. Williamson v. United States, 311 F .2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., concurring).
7. The commentators have been virtually unanimous in calling tor more aggressive
application of the due process clause in this area. See, e.g., Abramson & Lindeman,
Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal C()Urls, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139 (1!180); Mascolo,

Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Conduct That Shocks the Conscience: The Right
Not to be Enticed or Induced to CriTIU? by Government aiul Its Agents, 7 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 1 (1984); Comment, When Use of the Entrapment Defense is Barred; Is There a Viable
A.lternative Defense?, 5 CooLEY L. REV. 203 (19!l8) [hereinafter Comment, EntrapTIU?nf
Dt:_fense]; Comment, Entrapment, De Lorean and the Undercover Operation: A Constitutivna/
Connection, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 365 (1985); Comment, Entrapment and Dw: Proce.<s:
How For is Too Far?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1207 (1984).
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against self-incrimination, under Miranda v. Arizona8 statements
made by suspects in custody responding to interrogation will be
inadmissible to prove guilt at trial. 9 Similarly, under the fourth
amendment search and seizure provision, evidence will be excluded
if police officers failed to obtain a required warrant prior to
searching or seizing.10 Even in the usual case involving application
of entrapment law, the defendant will not be convicted if the
police improperly instigated the crime.11
Numerous cases of police overinvolvement remain, however,
which are not so easily handled by looking to the standard attacks
on the admission of evidence or on convictions. For instance,
warnings under Miranda become somewhat irrelevant if the
defendant has been deprived of adequate food and clothing for
too long a period, 12 has been cut off from others during
interrogation,13 or has been lied to regarding the charges against
her. 14 In such situations the United States Supreme Court has
not hesitated to reverse the defendants' convictions by applying
the due process clause rather than the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.15
8. 384 u.s. 436 (1~66).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). While statements obtained in violation of
Miranda may not be used to prove the guilt of the defendant at trial, they may be used to
impeach the defendant's in-court testimony. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
10. The seminal case in this area is Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied
the fourth amendment to the states and established the exclusionary rule for evidence
unlawfully obtained under the Constitution. But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), which put forth the so-called "good faith" exception to the rule of exclusion. Now
evidence may be admitted if the police officers in reasonable good faith relied on a
judicial warrant which later turned out to be invalid. Jd. at 913.
11. The key issue in most entrapment prosecutions will be whether the defendants
were predisposed to commit the crime. See Judge Learned Hand's statement in United
States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952): .. [W]as the accused ready and willing
without persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the
offence['?]"
12. See Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (petitioner's "confession," in which he
implicated himself in a prison riot and which followed two weeks of detention in a tiny
bare cell shared by two other inmates, during which time the petitioner was forced to
remain naked and was fed only twelve ounces of soup and eight ounces of water per
day, held involuntary as the result of coercion).
13. Id.
14. Lynumm v. Dlinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
15. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936):
The due process clause requires .. that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the
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Similarly, in the fourth amendment setting, the Supreme Court
has held that certain activities by law enforcement officials are
so contrary to a civilized society that these activities will not be
permitted under the due process clause. The most famous case
in this area is Rochin v. California, 16 in which law enforcement
officers forced a suspect to undergo a stomach pumping procedure
in a medical facility. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix
Frankfurter found that such police conduct could not be tolerated
as a matter of due process. He explained the basis for the Court's
conclusion:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause "inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment
upon the whole course of the proceedings [resulting in a
conviction] in order to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notion of
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged
with the most heinous offenses." These standards of justice
are not authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they
were specifics. Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities
which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental," or are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty ." 17

Entrapment issues are somewhat more problematic when
examining police overinvolvement in crime. Most jurisdictions in
the United States, including the federal system, have adopted an
entrapment test which focuses on the defendant's state of mind
prior to the commission of the crime. 18 If the evidence shows
that the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the crime, the
entrapment defense will fail. In these jurisdictions,19 once the
sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these peti·
tioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for
conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process.
Id. at 286 (citation omitted). In Broum, the defendants confessed to murder following
prolonged torture by state officials which included a partial hanging and severe whippings
with a leather strap. Id. at 280-83.
16. 342 u.s. 165 (1952).
17. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 169 (citations omitted).
18. As a result, this test is normally referred to as the "subjective test," which looks
to the individual propensities of the defendant. For a discussion of the point, see P.
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE ch. 2 (1989).
19. Approximately twelve jurisdictions use the so-called objective test which looks
entirely to the government conduct to determine if such conduct was excessive. Id. at
ch. 3.

1989]

EXPANDING DUE PROCESS

77

entrapment defense fails because the defendant was predisposed,
the question of government overinvolvement in crime then
becomes one of constitutional dimension. Could another claim,
under the due process clause, be successful in attacking
government overinvolvement in crime?20
II.

THE BASIS FOR THE DUE PROCESS ATTACK

The Supreme Court has never expressly held that a due
process claim can be successful in cases where the entrapment
defense fails. It is virtually beyond dispute, however, that a
majority of the Justices- given the appropriate case- would so
hold. The Court has referred to the due process claim in language
which has persuaded virtually all state and federal judges dealing
with the issue that such a constitutional claim exists. For instance,
in United States v. Russell,21 Justice Rehnquist stated that "[w]hile
we may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, the instant
case is distinctly not of that breed."22 Justice Powell, in Hampton
'V. United States, 23 intimated that the due process claim could be
accepted, though with difficulty: "I emphasize that the cases, if
any, in which proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be
20. The due process claim is different from the entrapment defense though both
claims may arise in the same case. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319, 1322
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978): "'[A]part from any question of predisposition of a defendant to commit the offense in question, governmental participation may
be so outrageous or fundamentally unfair as to deprive the defendant of due process of
law ... .'" (quoting United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976)).
Judge Brown explained the point clearly: "[The due process claim's] kinship to entrapment is not that the act of a Government representative induced the commission of a
crime. Rather, it is that the means used to 'make' the case are essentially revolting to
an ordered society." Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (Brown, J., concurring).
21. 411 u.s. 423 (1973).
22. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (citation omitted). In Russell, the
defendant was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing the drug methamphetamine. The
undercover agent investigating the defendant's activities had supplied the defendant with
an essential ingredient used to manufacture the drug. Id. at 424-26.
Along with Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, Justice Rehnquist apparently
retreated from this view in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), where his
plurality opinion concluded, in Justice Powell's words, that "no matter what the circumstances, neither due process principles nor our supervisory powers could support a bar
to conviction in any case where the Government is able to prove predisposition." !d. at
495 (Powell, J., concurring).
23. 425 u.s. 484 (1976).
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rare. Police overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a
demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar
conviction."24 Justice Brennan echoed these comments in Mathews
v. United States,2 5 stating that "[s]ome governmental conduct
might be sufficiently egregious to violate due process."26
Today, looking to these statements, as well as to cases such
as Rochin v. California, 27 state and lower federal judges
consistently write that a due process claim can be entertained if
the government action is "so outrageous that it violates the
concept of fundamental fairness inherent in due process and
shocks the sense of universal justice mandated by the due process
clause." 28 Perhaps the best statement of the proposition was put
forth by Judge Friendly:
[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit
government agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely
to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of
hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involving participation in activities that result in injury to the rights of its
citizens is a course that courts should be extremely reluctant
to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents naturally tend to
assign great weight to the societal interest in apprehending
and convicting criminals; the danger is that they will assign
too little to the rights of citizens to be free from governmentinduced criminality.29

Few lawyers today challenge the existence of a due process
claim regarding government overinvolvement in crime. What is
truly amazing, however, is how few cases have arisen in which
the due process challenge has been used to strike down a
conviction. The leading case on point is United States v. Twigg, 30
in which the defendant was convicted of manufacturing and
possessing narcotics with the intent to distribute. 31 A government
agent contacted the defendant, and encouraged him to set up a
24. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7.
25. 108 S. Ct. 883 (1988).
26. Mathews v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 888 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
27. 342 u.s. 165 (1952).
28. State v. Pleasant, 38 Wash. App. 78, 82, 684 P.2d 761, 764 (1984) (citing Hampton
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 493 (1976)).
29. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973).
30. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
31. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 375.
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"speed" laboratory.32 Ultimately, the defendant agreed and handled
financing and distribution for the operation, but it was the
government officer who obtained the equipment and materials
necessary to produce the drug. 33 During this period the
government officer controlled the manufacturing process and the
laboratory .=34 The court found that the government involvement
in the creation of the crime in this case was "so overreaching as
to bar prosecution of defendants as a matter of due process of
law.":Js The court focused its attention on the fact that in this
case-unlike other similar cases-the defendant was not shown
to have been actively involved in the production or distribution
of narcotics until after the government agent induced him to
engage in such activities. The majority noted that:
[T]he DEA agents deceptively implanted the criminal design
in [the defendant's] mind. They set him up, encouraged him,
provided the essential supplies and technical expertise, and
when he . . . encountered difficulties in consummating the
crime, they assisted in finding solutions. This egregious conduct on the part of government agents generated new crimes
by the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal
charges against him when, as far as the record reveals, he
was lawfully and peacefully minding his own affairs. Fundamental fairness does not permit us to countenance such actions by law enforcement officials and prosecution for a crime
so fomented by them will be barred.36

United States v. Lard37 is another case where the government
involvement was simply too extensive to be condoned. In Lard,
state and federal agents attempted to buy illegal weapons and
explosives from the defendant.38 The defendant initially refused
to provide the weapons, but ultimately agreed after numerous
requests by the government officials.39 The due process language
of the court, once again, is striking: "[The agent's] conduct was
not aimed at facilitating discovery or suppression of ongoing
illicit dealings and unregistered firearms. Rather, it was aimed
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

!d.
Id.
!d.
!d. at 377.

!d. at 381.
734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984).
United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1292.

!d.
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at creating new crimes for the sake of bringing criminal charges
against Lard, who, before being induced was lawfully and
peacefully minding his own affairs." 40
People v. Isaacson41 is another extreme case in which the due
process clause was used to void a conviction. In this case, a police
informant induced the defendant to commit a drug offense.42 The
informant had previously been arrested by the New York State
Police for possession of a controlled substance. 43 During
questioning following arrest, a police investigator struck the
arrestee "with such force as to knock him out of a chair, then
kicked him, resulting in a cutting of his mouth and forehead, and
shortly thereafter threatened to shoot him." 44 When the police
lab report revealed the "controlled substance" to be nothing but
caffeine, the police failed to inform the arrestee. Instead, the
police used the threat of a lengthy prison term to induce the
arrestee to assist in producing drug arrests. 45 The informant then
contacted the defendant and pleaded with him to make a cocaine
sale, finally tricking the defendant, at police request, into crossing
the state line to complete the sale.46 Dismissing the indictment,
the New York Court of Appeals condemned the police conduct
as "an incredible geographical shell game" which revealed "the
ugliness of police brutality [and] ... a brazen and continuing
pattern in disregard of fundamental rights." 47
III.

THE APPLICATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Many courts express willingness to strike down convictions on
due process grounds when police conduct is viewed as sufficiently
outrageous. Cases actually voiding convictions, however, are very
few in number, as courts have given the due process clause
extremely limited application. For example, in United States v.
Tobias, 48 the due process claim failed even though a government
undercover drug agent established an illegal drug laboratory for
40. Id. at 1297.
41. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
42. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d at 514-18, 378 N.E.2d at 79-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at
715-17.
43. Id. at 514, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
44. Id. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
45. Id., 378 N.E.2d at 79-80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16.
46. Id. at 516-18, 378 N.E.2d at 80-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17.
47. Id. at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
48. 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).

1989]

EXPA.'IDING DUE PROCESS

81

the defendant, sent him the necessary chemicals for the lab, and
on at least thirteen different occasions gave advice to the
defendant as to the manufacturing process for the drug.49 Although
the court concluded that the facts in the case "set the outer
limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret
out and prosecute crimes," 50 the court affirmed the defendant's
conviction.
Even in cases in which the defendant has been "pretargeted"
for investigation and prosecution by government agents,51 the
due process clause is rarely invoked successfully. Indeed, the
Fifth Circuit expressly overruled a case in which due process
was held to be violated when such "pretargeting" had occurred.
In United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 52 the court refused to
invalidate the conviction when it was shown that the informant
would be compensated "based on the government's evaluation of
his overall performance." 53 Instead of utilizing a due process
approach to such a predetermined investigation, the court found
that the jury could "weigh the defendant's arguments about the
inherent unreliability of 'purchased' testimony."54
Numerous other cases demonstrate that judges are very
reluctant to apply the due process analysis even in cases of
extreme government involvement in crime.55 To be sure, the
49. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384.
50. ld. at 387.
51. ?retargeting refers to the situation in which a particular defendant is picked out
for the undercover agent's or informant's efforts by the government. Often the undercover
agent is not paid for her efforts unless the pretargeted defendant is arrested or convicted.
&F' United States v. Lane, 693 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1982) (contingent fee arrangement
with informant did not violate entrapment standards since informant did not implicate
pretargeted defendants); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1962)
lconviction based on informant's testimony reversed because government failed to justify
or explain the contingent fee arrangement with informant).
52. 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987).
53. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 311. Although the informant
testified that his fee did not depend on the ultimate conviction of the defendant, id. at
:312, a dissenting judge insisted that the fee "depended upon the outcome of the case and
the quality of (the informant's] testimony." Id. at 316 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 316. Cerl)antes-Pa.-:heco overruled Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441
(5th Cir. 1962), which had established the rule that an informant paid on a contingency
fee basis is per se an incompetent witness. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 312. The court
compared such an informant's testimony with testimony procured through a plea bargain.
Id. at 315. As the dissent noted, however, recognizing that plea bargain arrangements
increase incentives to give perjured testimony does not justify legitimizing yet another
incentive to lie. ld. at 316 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
55. Undoubtedly, the most controversial cases in which the courts generally refused
to apply the due process analysis were the so-called ABSCAM prosecutions. The FBI, in
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United States Supreme Court has been perhaps the most reluctant
court in the country to apply the due process clause in this area.
The leading case is Hampton v. United States, 56 in which the
evidence showed, in dissenting Justice Brennan's view, that "the
Government's agent deliberately set up the accused by supplying
him with contraband and then bringing him to another agent as
a potential purchaser ."57 Justice Brennan maintained that in this
situation the "Government is doing nothing less than buying
contraband from itself through an intermediary and jailing the
intermediary."56 Even in this extreme situation the majority of
the Court found no difficulty in affirming the conviction. The
Court rationalized that the government agents were acting in
concert with the defendant and that the defendant was predisposed
to commit the crime for which he was convicted: "If the police
engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the
scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally
culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the
applicable provisions of state or federal law." 59 While Justices
Powell and Blackmun were not willing to concur in Justice
Rehnquist's statement that perhaps the due process clause could
never apply in this area,60 the two concurring Justices concluded
that the facts in this case did not bar conviction of the predisposed
defendant as a matter of due process.61
CONCLUSION

I believe we have lost sight of the reasons for allowing
substantial government involvement in the detection and
a series of cases, offered bribes to government officials. Subsequently, some of the officials
accepted the bribes and were then prosecuted for official corruption. In the leading case,
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), the
court en bane refused to find a due process violation because the behavior of the FBI
agents did not rise to the necessary level of outrageousness. Id. at 609. The dissenting
opinion of Judge Aldisert is a strong indictment of the government's position in connection
with the ABSCAM cases: "Federal public policy, and, indeed, basic social policy, dictate
that it is better to let a technical transgressor go free than to allow federal law
enforcement officials to manufacture crime that entraps the unwary innocent." Id. at 615
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). Interestingly, state judges have been considerably more receptive
to the due process claims than federal judges. See, e.g., State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082
(Fla. 1985); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1982); Commonwealth v. Matthews,
347 Pa. Super. Ct. 320, 500 A.2d 853 (1985).
56. 425 u.s. 484 (1976).
57. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 490.
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61. Jd. at 492-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
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investigation of crime. Our justice system allows this activity in
order to stop crime and to incarcerate criminals. Undoubtedly
the process of detecting and investigating crime is a difficult one
in which we should resist reversing convictions simply based on
our feelings of being offended by "some fastidious squeamishness
or private sentimentalism about combating crime too
energetically."62 Still, to have judicial opinions which hold that
the due process clause only forbids the government from entirely
manufacturing crime is intolerable.63 More preferable, and more
compatible with fundamental fairness is Justice Frankfurter's
view that the courts of the United States must "accommodate
the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods
adequate to counter the ingenuity of modern criminals." 64 This
means that the due process clause requires a close and very
careful judicial scrutiny of intensive police involvement in crime.
For example, the Supreme Court should have strongly condemned
the conduct of the government officers in the Hampton case
where the government essentially both sold the narcotics to the
defendant and bought the narcotics back from him. I agree with
Judge Hastie's view as stated twenty-five years ago in a virtually
identical case:
But when the government's own agent has set the accused
up in illicit activity by supplying him with narcotics and then
introducing him to another government agent as a prospective
buyer, the role of government has passed the point of toleration. Moreover, such conduct does not facilitate discovery or
suppression of ongoing illicit traffic in drugs. It serves no
justifying social objective. Rather, it puts the law enforcement
authorities in the position of creating new crime for the sake
of bringing charges against a person they had persuaded to
participate in wrongdoing.6s

Without question, as the Supreme Court has noted, a certain
amount of "stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the
arsenal of the police officer,"66 and "the government may use
62. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
63. The Ninth Circuit has held that generally to constitute a due process violation,
the government must have "engineered and directed the criminal enterprise from start
to finish." United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986). See Comment,
Eutrapment De.fense, supra note 7, at 221.
64. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1958) !Frankfurter, J., concurring).
65. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975).
66. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
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artifice and strategem to ferret out criminal activity."67 But when
the government is involved in the creation of crime, when police
officers persuade reluctant individuals to complete a crime, and
when agents are allowed to focus exclusive attention in a
"contingent fee arrangement" on specific defendants, law
enforcement goes beyond mere stealth and strategy and becomes
conduct which is, simply put, shocking to the conscience. This
conduct does and should offend the common sense of fair play
and decency, and should be offensive to American citizens. In
short, it is conduct which violates the due process clause. Without
such a conclusion, our faith in the efficient, effective, and legitimate
means of law enforcement will be eroded, and confidence in the
government's handling of the criminal justice system will be
destroyed. Justice Brandeis made the point so very well more
than fifty years ago:
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means- to declare that the Government may commit crimes
in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution. Against the pernicious doctrine
this Court should resolutely set its face. 68

67. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)).
68. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

